First, what effects do possible-selves ("potential" aspects of the self in the future) have on information processing, compared with those of actual-selves? Second, what features of these possible-selves produce these effects? To examine these questions, the Ropers, Kuiper, & Kirker (1977)'s paradigm was adopted. 64 subjects were asked to make judgments for each of 48 items in one of four ways of making a judgment: Semantic, ability, actual-self-referent, and possible-self-referent judgments. Items were adjectives or phrases with positive or negative valence. Subjects took a surprise recall test and rated several aspects of their possible-selves. (1) Possible-self judgment produced memory comparable to actual-self judgment, and those judgments surpassed ability and semantic judgments. (2) Subjects with higher self-ratings for "necessity for change" or for "future fear" recalled significantly more negative-content items and less positive-content items. These findings were discussed in terms of Schutz (1964)'s "relevance" theory.