Some
Limitations of Reductionistic Models of Mental Disorders
G. Shean |
The
biological perspective has dominated the psychiatric literature since
the late 1960s. Today many articles and textbooks are written as
though it has been established that major mental disorders are caused
by brain disorders. The evidence on which these statements are founded
however, is often equivocal. Biological theorists are reductionisms.
They assume that brain-behavior explanations proceed in one direction,
from brain to behavior. Psychosocial factors are considered to be
secondary influences, if they are considered at all, in explanations
of mental disorders. These theorists tend to overlook two fundamental
aspects of reductionistic explanatory models: (1) mental and social
phenomena cannot be adequately understood at the level of physical
processes, and (2) brain-behavior influences can proceed in either
direction. This paper will review the reasons why much evidence of
biological causality of mental disorders should be considered to
be tentative rather than conclusive. It is argued that adequate explanatory
models of mental disorders require adoption of a General Systems
Theory model that will allow for the integration of knowledge from
multiple levels of analysis, including biological, psychosocial,
and cultural influences. Key wards: reductionism, biological psychiatry, general systems theory. |